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NOTES
MOTHER V. FETUS-THE CASE OF "DO OR
DIE": IN RE A.C.
"Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and
unto God the things that are God's."
Matthew 22:21
The appellate courts have confronted only recently the issue of involunta-
rily sacrificing a mother's rights for the sake of her fetus. In re A.C.' in-
volved a terminally-ill mother who refused to have a Caesarean operation
which potentially would have reduced her life span but would have saved
her fetus. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ultimately
found that George Washington Hospital could perform a Caesarean section
on the mother without her permission.2
Court ordered surgery on a pregnant woman inevitably affects not only
the mother, but also her fetus. In In re A. C. ,3 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia was confronted with a most perplexing issue that not
only involved legal, but also moral, medical, religious, philosophical, techno-
logical and social considerations. 4 While the voluntary murder of one's
1. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated and reh'g granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Judge Nebeker, contemplating these considerations, suggested that "[i]t would be far
better if, by legislation, these bioethical decisions could be made by duly constituted and in-
formed ethical groups within the health care system, and if desired, appellate review as pro-
vided in other administrative proceedings." 533 A.2d at 612. This suggestion leads one to
believe that Judge Nebeker believes this to be a case which is not proper for a judge to consider
because of the complex medical facts involved and the expediency in which they need to be
digested and utilized by the decision-maker. Other courts deciding similar issues as those
involved in In re A. C. have recognized the same difficulties. In In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344,
486 A.3d 1209, 1220 (1985), the court stated that "[n]o one person or profession has all the
answers." Another court stated:
[MW]e are involved in a difficult and demanding area of the law in which each case
presents issues of fundamental importance that require more than the mere 'mechan-
ical reliance on legal doctrine' (citation omitted). We encourage and seek insights
and 'the collective guidance of those in health care, moral ethics, philosophy, and
other disciplines.' Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 429,
497 N.E.2d 626, 632 (1986) (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 736, 370 N.E.2d 417, 442 (1977)).
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child has not been sanctioned by our society as a protected right, the courts
recently have initiated the formation of the parameters of a pregnant wo-
man's right to die without any involuntary bodily invasion.5 Since the
courts only recently have confronted these cases, there is little juridical dis-
cord as to the pregnant woman's right.6
This Note will first examine a similar case, Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth.7 It will then survey three bodies of law: (1) the right to
privacy; (2) the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment; and
(3) the right of a parent to refuse medical treatment on behalf of his or her
offspring.' The Note will proceed with an examination of the facts and the
court's analysis in In re A.C, to be followed by a critical analysis of the
court's reasoning and of the ramification of this decision on future cases. It
is important to note that this case involved a very sensitive issue to which the
courts would rather not respond9 and which the legislature has not
addressed. 1o
I. RELEVANT LAW
Because Caesarean surgery involves an invasion of a pregnant woman's
person, the courts must consider the constitutional analysis of a woman's
right to bodily integrity and the established law which deals with a compe-
tent person's right to refuse medical treatment. Additionally, because the
refusal of treatment by the mother most likely will affect the health and life
5. The law involved in these types of cases actually dates back to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), concerning the privacy right of the mother and the state's interest in the viability of
the fetus.
6. The more complex and difficult issue for the courts is the one presented in In re A. C..
In this case, the court decided to forego the two days remaining in the mother's life in order to
make an attempt to save the fetus. This Note will use the term "fetus" and not "unborn
child." It is crucial to make the distinction between the two. The word "child" implies legal
status under the Constitution. The Supreme Court in Roe, however, did not determine
whether the "fetus" had legal status under the Constitution. 410 U.S. 113. "Fetus" is a scien-
tifically correct term for an unborn in the first few months of development. See Note, Family
Law-Court-Ordered Surgery for the Protection of a Viable Fetus-Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
Hosp. Auth., 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 125, 126 n.l 1 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Family Law].
7. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
8. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 615.
9. See id. at 612.
10. This is a controversial issue which has recently been written about in different forums.
See generally Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions. What's Wrong With Fetal
Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987); Bowes and Selgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights
Medical and Legal Perspectives, 58 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 209 (1981). For news
articles particularly about this case see Goodman, 'A Potential Life ... A Dying Mother',
Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 1987, at A27, col. 6; ACLU Asks Court to Rehear Case of Forced
Cesarean Birth, Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1987, at Al, col. 4; Remnick, Whose Life Is It, Anyway?,
Wash. Post Mag., Feb. 21, 1988, at 14.
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of the fetus detrimentally, the courts must examine the precedent concerning
the mother's right to refuse medical treatment for her child.11
A. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth.
One of the first cases decided by a state's high court addressing a preg-
nant mother's right to refuse a Caesarean section was Jefferson v. Griffin
Spalding County Hosp. Auth. 12 A woman, thirty-nine weeks pregnant, who
was an out-patient at Griffin Spalding County Hospital, refused to have
blood transfusions and a possible Caesarean section. Her doctor determined
that she was suffering from "placenta previa."13 Because of this condition,
there was a high probability that the child would not survive and that the
mother had only a fifty percent chance for survival if the child was born by
natural child birth. 14
The Georgia Supreme Court found the fetus to be viable and therefore
believed that the unborn child had the right under the United States Consti-
tution to have the protection of the state. 5 The court continued its analysis
by finding that the life of the mother and of the unborn child were at that
time inseparable. The court deemed it appropriate to infringe upon the
rights of the mother to the extent necessary to give the child an opportunity
to live. 16 In making this determination, the court balanced the intrusion into
the mother's life against the duty of the state to protect the unborn child
from meeting death before being provided the opportunity to live.1 7
B. The Privacy Right of a Pregnant Woman
Roe v. Wade 18 has developed into the paradigm case of a woman's right to
privacy" in the context of her decision to terminate her pregnancy. The
11. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 615.
12. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981). See also Note, Family Law, supra note 6.
13. "Placenta previa" occurs when the placenta blocks the birth canal. 247 Ga. at 86, 274
S.E.2d at 458. "[W]hen a woman with placenta previa goes into labor, the placenta tears loose
from the uterine wall, usually killing the fetus and at the same time causing loss of blood to the
mother." Note, Family Law, supra note 6, at 136 n.75 (citing Atlanta Journal/Constitution,
Jan. 24, 1981, at 1-A, col. 3).
14. Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
15. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460 (citing Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
16. Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
17. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460. The court's analysis was not extensive, citing only three
cases in its decision. Because of this paucity and the distinguishing facts the D.C. court set out
in it's opinion, the court in In re A. C believed the Jefferson case to be of limited assistance.
533 A.2d at 614.
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Roe's recognition of a "right to privacy" implicit in the U.S. Constitution was sub-
stantially based on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the United
19891
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Supreme Court in Roe concluded that there is a right of privacy, implicit in
the liberty secured by the fourteenth amendment, which "is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy.",20 The privacy right, although fundamental, is not absolute, and
must be considered against "compelling" state interests in the health of the
pregnant woman and in the potential life of the fetus.2 ' A state interest in
the potential life of the fetus reaches a compelling point at the stage of viabil-
ity. 22 After viability, the state may regulate or prohibit abortion except
when necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, to preserve the life or
health of the pregnant woman.23 Moreover, the Supreme Court did not ex-
plicitly provide the fetus with legal rights, but merely recognized a state in-
terest in the fetus. Therefore, the Court did not recognize the fetus as a
person with legal status and, consequently, the fetus is not afforded the same
rights as a newly born child.24
While the controversy of a fetus' legal rights continues, the Supreme
Court has attempted to clarify when the mother's rights prevail over the
state interest in the fetus. In Colautti v. Franklin,25 the Supreme Court
opined that a mother's right must prevail when the state attempts to sacrifice
the health, well-being, or life of the mother for the sake of the fetus. The
Court noted that the Pennsylvania, statute did not clearly establish that the
mother's health and life must always prevail over the fetus' health and life
when they conflict. 26 The Court, however, skirted the issue and held merely
States Supreme Court concluded, in a plurality decision, that while the right to privacy is not
an enumerated right, it does emanate from "zones of privacy" which can be found in the
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484.
20. 410 U.S. at 153.
21. Id. at 162. The Court stated: "These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows
in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each be-
comes 'compelling.'" Id. at 162-63.
22. The Supreme Court has recognized "viability" to mean "potentially able to live
outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id. at 160. Additionally, there must be
potentiality of "meaningful life," id. at 163, and not merely momentary survival. Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)). Addition-
ally, the Court noted that viability is usually placed at about twenty-eight weeks, but may
occur as early as twenty four weeks. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
23. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
24. Roe, 410 U.S 113'(1973); see also In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 616-17.
25. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
26. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400. The Court analyzed the statute and determined that it was
susceptible to a construction allowing for the mother's health and well being to be subordinate
to the fetus' health and life when both conflict. Therefore, the statute was determined to be
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 400-01. Section 5 of the statute in controversy read in perti-
nent part:
(a) Every person who performs or induces an abortion shall prior thereto have
made a determination based on his experience, judgment or professional competence
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that, in the absence of a more precise statute, a criminal sanction may not be
imposed on a physician who performs an abortion when the life and health
of the mother conflicts with the life and health of the fetus.2 7
The Court in a subsequent case, Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists,28 confirmed the implications of the Colautti lan-
guage when it stated that "this Court recognized the undesirability of any
'trade-off' between the woman's health and additional percentage points of
fetal survival.",29 The Thornburgh court, adopting the Third Circuit's rea-
soning, held the Pennsylvania statute to be facially invalid because the lan-
guage of the statute "is not susceptible to a construction that does not
require the mother to bear an increased medical risk in order to save her
viable fetus."3 The Court disregarded the vagueness argument and instead
ruled on its merits. In so doing, the Court developed a standard to utilize in
that the fetus is not viable, and if the determination is that the fetus is viable or if
there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable, shall exercise that
degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the
fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life
and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted and the abortion tech-
nique employed shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus
to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to
preserve the life or health of the mother.
(d) Any person who fails to make the determination provided for in subsection (a)
of this section, or who fails to exercise the degree of professional skill, care and dili-
gence or to provide the abortion technique as provided for in subsection (a) of this
section ... shall be subject to such civil or criminal liability as would pertain to him
had the fetus been a child who was intended to be born and not aborted. Id. at 380-
81 n.l.
27. Id. at 400-01.
28. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). The Supreme Court noted that the Third Circuit ruled that a
provision in the Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional because "it required a 'trade-off'
between the woman's health and fetal survival, and failed to require that maternal health be
the physician's paramount consideration." Id. at 768-69 (citation omitted).
The Pennsylvania statute, section 3210(b), read:
Every person who performs or induces an abortion after an unborn child has been
determined to be viable shall exercise that degree of professional skill, care and dili-
gence which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life
and health of any unborn child intended to be born and not aborted and the abortion
technique employed shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for the
unborn child to be aborted alive unless, in good faith judgment of the physician, that
method or technique would present a significantly greater medical risk to the life or
health of the pregnant woman than would another available method or technique
and the physician reports the basis for his judgment. The potential psychological or
emotional impact on the mother of the unborn child's survival shall not be deemed a
medical risk to the mother. Any person who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
violates the provisions of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree.
Id. at 768 n. 13 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 769 (quoting Colautti, 439 U.S. at 400).
30. Id. at 769.
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a case where the mother's and fetus' health and life conflict. Instead of re-
taining the "significantly greater medical risk" standard, which was used in
the Pennsylvania statute, the Court adhered to a lower "increased medical
risk" standard. Consequently, it implies that a statutorily required sacrifice
of health, welfare, or life of the mother for the sake of the fetus is constitu-
tionally unacceptable."a
C. Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 32
Absent some important governmental interest, an individual's right to re-
fuse medical treatment has generally been upheld as a basic right to control
one's body. 33 This right has been based on the right to privacy34 , informed
consent3 5 and self-determination. a6
31. Justice White, while cognizant of the implication of the majority's holding, remarked:
"[I]f the state's interest in preserving the life of a viable fetus is, as Roe purports to recognize, a
compelling one, the state is at very least entitled to demand that that interest not be
subordinated to a purported maternal health risk that is in fact wholly insubstantial." Id. at
807, (White, J., dissenting).
32. While the refusal of medical treatment may be potentially exercised by a competent or
incompetent adult or child, this Note will only speak to the law which deals with the
competent adult, since In re A. C. involves only a competent adult. However, it is worth noting
that the courts have extended the competent's right to refuse medical treatment to
incompetents. In such a case the courts have an additional burden of determining the
incompetent's probable intent. See, e.g., In re Conroy 98 N.J. 321, 345, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221
(1985); Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In
re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v.
Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
33. This concept dates back in our courts as far as Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891), where the Supreme Court refused to compel a personal injury plaintiff to
undergo a pretrial medical examination stating:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable au-
thority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley, "the right to one's person may be said
to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone."
'See also In re Conroy 98 N.J. 321, 346, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985). See generally In re
Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976).
34. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., 98 N.J. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1222, where the court stated:
The doctrine of informed consent is a primary means developed in the law to protect
this personal interest in the integrity of one's body. 'Under this doctrine, no medical
procedure may be performed without a patient's consent, obtained after explanation
of the nature of the treatment, substantial risks, and alternative therapies.' (Citation
omitted).
See also Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977);
In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
36. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497 N.E.2d
626, 633 (1986), in which the court stated:
The right of self-determination and individual autonomy has its roots deep in our
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While the fundamental principle of individual autonomy is well estab-
lished in our legal history, the fact that these principles are not unqualified is
just as well implanted in our society. Courts and commentators have com-
monly identified four state interests that may restrain the person's right to
refuse medical treatment: preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting in-
nocent third parties, and maintaining the integrity of the medical
profession. a
Commonly considered the most significant of the four state interests is the
preservation of life.38 In cases that do not involve the protection of an actual
or potential life of someone other than the decision-maker, the state's tan-
gential interest in preserving life will usually become subordinate to the more
direct or personal interest of the competent person to control his body. "In-
deed, insofar as the 'sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination
[are] fundamental constituents of life,' the value of life may be lessened
rather than increased 'by the failure to allow a competent human-being the
right of choice.' ,31
Pursuant to the state's "preservation of life" objective, states have promul-
gated statutes to prevent suicide or the aiding of a suicide.' Some states
attempt to categorize the refusal of treatment as suicide. However, it has
been noted by many courts that declining life-sustaining medical treatment is
not an attempt to commit suicide.4" Generally, the intent to commit suicide
is lacking when the patient declines any medical treatment. The patient de-
clines medical treatment in order to not violate a religious doctrine or for
various other reasons, but the patient does not decline the treatment with the
intent to commit suicide. Therefore, the person is not considered to be com-
history. John Stuart Mill stated the concept succinctly: '[Tihe only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or mor-
tal, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because,
in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.' MILL, ON LIBERTY,
in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 271 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952), quoted
in In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 236, 480 A.2d 93 (1984) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See also 98 N.J. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223.
37. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d at 425; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 121, 660 P.2d 738, 743; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223; Application
of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 978 (1964).
38. See, e.g., 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223; 373 Mass. at 740, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
39. 98 N.J. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1223-24 (citation omitted).
40. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1982).
41. See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626,
634 (1986); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at 426. But see Application of President
& Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at 1009.
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mitting suicide.42
Because the general precept of the medical profession is to save lives, the
idea of allowing a patient to die contravenes one of the medical profession's
most basic principles.43 Consequently, the maintenance of the integrity of
the medical profession has frequently been asserted as a limitation on a pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment. However, this interest, like the in-
terest in the prevention of suicide, has had in actuality little effect on the
patient's refusal right. 44 As the court in In re Conroy stated:
Medical ethics do not require medical intervention in disease at all
costs. As long ago as 1624, Francis Bacon wrote, 'I esteem it the
office of a physician not only to restore health, but to mitigate pain
and dolours; and not only when such mitigation may conduce to
recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage.' 45
The court continued by explaining that physicians today distinguish between
the curable and the dying:
'[T]hey refuse to treat the curable as if they were dying or ought to
die, and that they have sometimes refused to treat the hopeless and
dying as if they were curable.' Indeed, recent surveys have sug-
gested that a majority of practicing doctors now approve of passive
euthanasia and believe that it is being practiced by members of the
profession.46
The state interest that seems to have the most limiting effect on the pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment is the protection of innocent third
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26; In re Colyer, 99 Wash.
2d 114, 121, 660 P.2d 738, 743-44; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1224; Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. at 439-40, 497 N.E.2d at 638; Application of Presi-
dent & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at 1009.
44. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d at 425; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 121, 660 P.2d 738, 743; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223; Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. at 439-40, 497 N.E.2d at 638; Application of President &
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at 1009.
45. 98 N.J. at 352, 486 A.2d at 1224-25 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 352, 486 A.2d at 1225. As the New Jersey Supreme Court similarly expressed,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted:
[T]he prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recognize that the dying are more
often in need of comfort than treatment. Recognition of the right to refuse necessary
treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores;
such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the medical profession, the
proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients or the State's interest in protecting
the same. It is not necessary to deny a right of self-determination to a patient in
order to recognize the interest of doctors, hospitals, and medical personnel in attend-
ance on the patient.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743-44, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27.
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parties.47 The patient's exercise of his or her free choice will many times
become subordinate to the state interest because his or her choice to die will
adversely affect the health or life of others.4 8 Frequently, while other state
interests will not prevail, courts will rule in favor of this state interest even to
override religious objections.49
When examining the person's right to refuse medical treatment and the
state compelling interest, the court must conduct a delicate balancing of the
two. In most circumstances, even if the patient's condition is hopeless, the
patient's right of privacy outweighs the state interest in preserving life,
preventing suicide or safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession.5°
However, the patient's rights can be subordinated when the interest of the
state involves the protection of an innocent third party. The balance then
will tip usually in favor of the state interest.5
D. Parental Rights to Withhold Treatment
Another line of cases which must be considered when confronted with a
pregnant woman's refusal of medical treatment concerns the right of parents
to withhold treatment from their minor children. 52 As one court noted:
It is well-settled that parents are the 'natural guardians of their
children [with] the legal as well as moral obligation to support...
educate' and care for their children's development and well-be-
ing .... Indeed, these 'natural rights' of parents have been recog-
nized as encompassing an entire 'private realm of life which must
be afforded protection from unwarranted State interference.'53
47. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d at 425; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 121, 660 P.2d 738, 743; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 349, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223; Application
of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at 1008.
48. See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 422,
201 A.2d 537, 538 (1968), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1969) (court order forced blood transfu-
sions for mother for sake of her child); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498,
500, 320 A.2d 518, 520 (1974).
49. See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
at 1008 (ordering the mother of a seven-month-old infant to submit to a blood transfusion over
her religious objections because of the mother's "responsibility to the community to care for
her infant"); Raleigh, 42 N.J. 421, 422, 201 A.2d 537, 538; Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson,
128 N.J. Super. 498, 500, 320 A.2d 518, 520; Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278
F. Supp. 488 (1967); Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983); In re Melideo, 88
Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); Crouse
Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Supp. 1985).
50. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
52. Of course the relevancy of these cases depends on the legal status of the fetus. See
supra notes 6, 15-27 and accompanying text.
53. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E. 2d 1053, 1062 (Mass. 1978) (citations omitted). See
also In re Philip B. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 53 (1979).
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Parental autonomy, however, is not absolute. The state, through the doc-
trine ofparenspatriae, has the duty and responsibility to care for and protect
those who are unable to care for and protect themselves. 54 The use of this
doctrine provides the state a vehicle with which to intervene when a parent
refuses to give his or her consent to medical treatment that will substantially
benefit the child's health or life.55 In non-life-threatening circumstances, the
courts have upheld the parent's right to refuse medical treatment for his or
her child.56 However, most cases involve a life-threatening situation for the
child, and, in such cases, courts will allow the state to intervene to protect
the child.5
The distinction between the mother's right to refuse medical treatment for
herself and the mother's right to refuse medical treatment for her child be-
comes critical when the health and life of the mother contravenes the health
and life of the fetus. The distinction revolves around the legal status given to
the fetus. If the fetus is given legal status equal to that of an infant then the
cases preventing parents from refusing medical treatment for their children
would be controlling. Consequently, the state could successfully prevent the
mother from refusing to have a Caesarean section that would benefit the
child. However, if the fetus is not given legal status equal to that of an
infant, then the cases which allow an individual to refuse medical treatment
54. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 730, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
55. Id.; In re Philip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979) (court ordered
surgery for a child with congenital heart defect over parent's objections); Crouse Irving Memo-
rial Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 102, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (Supp. 1985) (court
ordered pregnant woman to receive blood transfusions to protect the welfare of a fetus that
was to be prematurely delivered); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp.
488, 504 (1967) (Washington statute empowering judges to authorize blood transfusions for
children against parent's wishes was not constitutionally invalid); but see Taft v. Taft, 388
Mass. 331, 332, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983) (court vacated judgement of lower court ordering
a woman, four months pregnant, to undergo a "purse string" operation to prevent miscar-
riage).
The underlying rationale of parens patriae is reflected in the oft quoted statement by the
Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944): "Parents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves."
56. See, e.g., In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 348, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (1972); but see In re Philip
B., 92 Cal. App. 3d at 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (1979).
57. See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 377 U.S. 978 (1964) ; Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Memorial Hosp. v.
Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 422, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (1968), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1969);
Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 500, 320 A.2d 518, 520 (1979); Jehovah's
Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (1967); Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446
N.E.2d 395 (1983); In re Melideo, 88 Misc.2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1976); In re Osborne,
294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101,
485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Supp. 1985).
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for one's self will control. Consequently, the mother would be able to suc-
cessfully refuse the Caesarean section.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND COURT'S ANALYSIS OF IN RE A. C.
A. Facts
To fully appreciate this particular case, the reader must understand the
sensitive nature of the facts. Angela Carder, in her twenty-fifth week of
pregnancy, was admitted to the George Washington University Medical
Center after a doctor, in a regularly scheduled prenatal visit, diagnosed her
shortness of breath and back pain as a tumor mass in her lung. This was
determined to be a metastatic oxygenic carcinoma.5" The doctor's prognosis
was that Carder was terminal. 59
On June 15, 1987, in her twenty sixth week of pregnancy, Carder agreed
to be treated with experimental chemotherapy in order to relieve her pain
and prolong her life for a few more weeks." She assented to this treatment
because her doctors believed the fetus' "chances of viability would be greatly
increased if it were delivered when it had reached twenty-eight weeks gesta-
tional age."6 The next day, the tumor began to worsen more rapidly than
the doctors had expected.62 However, because the doctors sedated her to
enable her to breathe, they were not able to ask her whether she desired
delivery by Caesarean section in her twenty-sixth week despite the fact that
the baby's chance of survival or being born without defects would be low. 63
The hospital administration decided it was obligated to seek the guidance
of the Superior Court for the District of Columbia." The court heard argu-
58. In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 615. Angela Carder was originally diagnosed with leukemia
when she was thirteen years old. Prior to this bout with the disease, she lived through two
other episodes of the disease. During these hard times she had one leg amputated and half of
her pelvis removed because of cancer. See also Remnick, supra note 10, at 14.
59. In re A.C., 53 A.2d at 615.
60. Id.; see also Remnick, supra note 10, at 18.
61. 533 A.2d at 612.
62. At this time everyone involved understood that Angela Carder was not going to live to
the twenty-eighth week which would have given the fetus a greater probability of survival.
"Things were starting to happen at a pace that would bewilder everyone for months to come."
Lewis Hamner, A.C.'s obstetrician, later remarked, "We didn't realize how quickly she would
deteriorate .... Jefferey Moscow, Angie's oncologist from [National Institute of Health], told
Hamner he'd rarely seen such a rapid advance." Remnick, supra note 10, at 19.
63. 533 A.2d at 612-13; Remnick, supra note 10, at 19. However, before Carder was
heavily sedated, the doctors discussed with her the possibility of performing an operation in
the twenty-eighth week, to which she assented. But, unfortunately, a twenty-sixth week opera-
tion was not discussed.
64. The impetus behind the hospital's desire to seek a court ruling was their fear of a
possible law suit if they did not actively attempt to save the baby and allowed it to die with the
mother. 533 A.2d at 617; Remnick, supra note 10, at 15; see, e.g., Greater Southeast Commu-
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ments from the lawyers representing the fetus, Angela Carder and the city,65
as well as testimony from Carder's parents, Carder's husband, and doctors.66
After hearing the arguments, the Superior Court ordered the Caesarean
section.
67
Shortly after the judge ordered the surgery, Dr. Hamner informed Carder
of the court's decision. She agreed to the surgery, aware that she may not
survive it. However, one half hour later, Dr. Hamner brought Carder's par-
ents and another doctor to verify her answer. This time she indicated she
did not want the surgery performed. 6' The trial court reconsidered in light
of Carder's stated intent, but allowed the court's original ruling to stand.
Judge Sullivan believed her sudden change of heart was a reflection that her
intent still was not clear.69
On appeal, a hastily assembled Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia affirmed the decision of the trial court. 70 The Caesarean section was
nity Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 397 (D.C. 1984). (The D.C. Court of Appeals inter-
preted the D.C. Wrongful Death statute, 1981 D.C. Stat. 16-2701, to include a "viable fetus"
as a "person injured.").
65. Vincent Burke, an attorney for the hospital, cited In Re Maydun, 114 Daily Wash. L.
Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986). In re Maydun involved, a 19 year old woman
whose pregnancy had come to term and whose long labor placed the fetus at risk of developing
a fatal infection. The Superior Court judge ordered the Caesarean section. See Remnick,
supra note 10, at 19.
Barbara Mishkin, the attorney for the fetus, argued:
We are not confronted with the problem of choosing between the life of the mother
and the life of the fetus. Sadly, the life of the mother is lost to us no matter what
decision is made at this point. The mother is fatally ill and has very little time left.
The loss to the mother at this point is in terms of hours of insensate existence, as best
we can determine.
Record at 64, In re A.C. (No. 87-609); see also Remnick, supra note 10, at 19.
Robert Sylvester, the attorney for A.C., argued that "from conversations that Angie had
had previously with family members and hospital staff, it was clear that Angie would not want
the operation." Remnick, supra note 10, at 19.
66. In In re A.C. the court noted: "Those physicians who objected to the proposed sur-
gery did so because A.C. refused her consent to the procedure, not because the surgery was
medically objectionable." 533 A.2d at 613.
67. Judge Sullivan relied on the doctor's testimony that the fetus " 'has approximately a
50 to 60 percent chance to survive if Caesarean section is performed as soon as possible' and
that was less than a 20 percent risk that the fetus would have a serious handicap such as
cerebral palsy or mental retardation. He had also been told that the baby's chances were worse
if they waited until the instant of Angie's death to deliver it." Remnick, supra note 10, at 20;
see also Record at 15.
68. Before Carder gave her negative answer, she inquired of Dr. Hamner, her obstetrician,
whether he would perform the operation. Dr. Hamner told her that he would not if she did
not want the operation. A.C. then answered, "I don't want it done. I don't want it done."
Remnick, supra note 10, at 21; see also Record at 92; In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 613.
69. See sources cited supra note 68.
70. 533 A.2d at 611. Michelle Harrison's graphic description of a Caesarean section, sim-
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ilar to the one ordered by the court in this case, assists the reader to better understand the
extent of the intrusion into Angela Carder's body:
The surgeon takes a scalpel from the nurse and with one strong and definite motion
creates a crescent-shaped incision along the woman's pubic hairline. As the skin is
cut, the subcutaneous tissue bulges upward as though it had been straining to get
through all the time. Within moments this fatty tissue, interconnected by thin trans-
parent fibers, becomes dotted and then covered with blood that oozes out of tiny
vessels. With scalpel and forceps-delicate tweezers---the surgeon cuts deeper be-
neath the subcutaneous tissue, to a thick layer of fibrous tissue that holds the abdom-
inal organs and muscles of the abdominal wall in place. Once reached, this fibrous
layer is incised and cut along the lines of the original surface incision while the mus-
cles adhering to this tissue are scraped off and pushed out of the way. The uterus is
now visible under the peritoneum, a layer of thin tissue, looking like Saran Wrap,
which covers most of the internal organs and which, when inflamed, produces perito-
nitis. The peritoneum is lifted away from the uterus and an incision is made in it,
leaving the uterus and bladder easily accessible. The bladder is peeled away from the
uterus, for the baby will be taken out through an incision in the uterus underneath
where the bladder usually lies ....
The obstetrician extends the initial cut either by putting two index fingers into the
small incision and ripping the uterus open or by using blunt-ended scissors and cut-
ting in two directions away from the initial incision. If the membranes are still in-
tact, they are now punctured by toothed forceps, and the fluid spills out onto the
table. In the normal position, the baby's head is down and under the incision, so the
obstetrician places one hand inside the uterus, under the baby's head, and with the
other hand exerts pressure on the upper end of the uterus to push the baby through
the abdominal incision. The assistant also uses force now to help push the baby out
The rest of the surgery is more difficult for the woman. There is more pain and
women often vomit and complain of difficult breathing as we handle their organs and
repair the damage ....
The placenta separates from or is peeled off the inside of the uterus. Then, since
the uterine attachments are all at the lower end, near the cervix, the body of the
uterus can be brought out of the abdominal cavity rested on the outside of the wo-
man's abdomen, thus adding both visibility and room in which to work.
With large circular needles and thick thread a combination of running and individ-
ual stitches is used to sew closed the hole in the uterus. A drug called pitocin is
added to the woman's IV to help the uterus contract and to decrease the bleeding.
Small sutures are used to tie and retie bleeding blood vessels. The "gutters," spaces
in the abdominal cavity, are cleared of blood and fluid. The uterus is then placed
back in the abdominal cavity. The bladder is sewn back onto the surface of the
uterus, and then finally the peritoneum is closed. Now sponges are counted to be
sure none have been left inside the abdominal cavity, and then the closure of the
abdominal wall begins.
Muscles overlying the peritoneum are pushed backed in place, and are sometimes
sewn with loose stitches. Fascia, the thick fibrous layer, is the most important one,
since it holds all the abdominal organs inside and keeps them from coming through
the incision, especially if the woman coughs or sneezes. Therefore this layer is closed
with heavy thread and many individual stitches so that, even if a thread breaks, the
stitches won't all come out. The subcutaneous tissue, most of which is fat, is closed
in loose stitches that mainly close any air spaces which might become sites for infec-
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performed.71
B. Analysis of the Decision on Appeal
The Court of Appeals found this case to be one of first impression.72 In
resolving this case, the court examined three modes of analysis: (1) the right
to privacy; (2) the right to refuse medical treatment; and (3) the parental
right to refuse treatment on behalf of his or her offspring. Additionally, it
examined Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Hosp. Auth. which addressed the is-
sue of whether a court should require the performance of a Caesarean
section.73
While realizing there is a delicate balance between a woman's bodily au-
tonomy and a compelling state interest, the court, relying on Roe v. Wade,
concluded that a compelling state interest existed which authorized the city
to intervene. 74 The court noted that the Supreme Court made it explicit that
a state may not always prohibit an abortion, but it may, however, prohibit
one when the fetus has any potentiality of living outside the mother's womb
naturally or artificially. 75 When this potentiality exists, "a balancing of the
interests must replace the single interest of the mother, and as in this case,
time can be a critical factor." 76
The more traditional rights of a competent adult to refuse treatment and a
parent to refuse treatment on behalf of her offspring were also considered in
the court's analysis. The right of privacy, which exists within the penumbras
of the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
tion. Skin, the final layer, is closed with either silk or nylon thread or metal staples
A dry bandage is placed over the woman's incision and then taped to her skin.
The drapes are removed. A baby has been born.
Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WO-
MEN'S L.J. 36 (1987) (quoting HARRISON, A WOMAN IN RESIDENCE, 81-84 (1982)).
71. The child, Lindsay Marie Carder, died less than two hours after the operation. An-
gela Carder died two days later. Remnick, supra note 10, at 21.
72. The Court of Appeals did not base its decision to allow the hospital to perform the
Caesarean section whether Angela Carder was competent and made an informed decision.
The court circumvented that issue and reached directly for the privacy right issue. In re A.C.,
533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated and reh'g granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988).
73. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981); see supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
74. 533 A.2d at 614; see supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. The court noted that
this case was not an abortion case, apparently attempting to relieve itself from any restraints
Roe and its progeny may have imposed. However, the court proceeded to do a Roe analysis in
order to support its outcome. In so doing, the court conveniently ignored the holding in
Thornburgh. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text; see also 533 A.2d at 614 n.4.
75. 533 A.2d at 614.
76. Id. at 614-15.
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encompasses the right of an individual to bodily integrity. 77 Furthermore,
an individual's right to bodily integrity encompasses a competent adult's
right to refuse treatment.78 However, the right to refuse medical treatment
must be balanced with the four countervailing state interests of preserving
life, preventing suicide, maintaining the integrity of the medical profession,
and protecting innocent third parties.7 9 The court was cognizant that "[t]he
state's interest in the preservation of life, prevention of suicide, and the integ-
rity of the medical profession, while significant, usually will not overcome
the [patient's] right to bodily integrity."' Judge Nebeker wrote that the
"state's interest in protecting innocent third parties from an adult's decision
to refuse medical treatment, however, may override the interest in bodily
integrity.,
8 1
The D.C. Court of Appeals recognized a significant difference between the
state's interest in authorizing medical treatment of a born child and the
state's interest in authorizing medical treatment of a fetus.8 2 The intrusive-
ness involved in the case of a born child is less substantial than in the case of
a fetus., Indeed, when the state authorizes the treatment of the fetus, it nec-
essarily authorizes the invasion of the mother's body. When the state autho-
rizes the treatment of the born child, however, it creates no physical
intrusion of the mother's body. Moreover, when the state attempts to pro-
tect the fetus' health and life, its interest may run directly counter to the
mother's interest in her sacred bodily integrity.83
Finally, the court balanced the mother's right against the state interest. It
concluded that although the surgery is intrusive to the mother, "[t]he Caesa-
77. See supra notes 18-31 accompanying text.
78. 533 A.2d at 615.
79. Id. (citations omitted). The court noted that the state's interest in preventing suicide
was not relevant, nor was safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession. Id.; see gener-
ally supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
80. 533 A.2d at 616.
81. 533 A.2d at 616; see also supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. The court ex-
plained that other courts have used this rationale to hold that parents may not withhold medi-
cal treatment from their children when their lives are in danger. Indeed, the D.C. Court of
Appeals recognized that some jurisdictions have equally applied this doctrine when an unborn
child is the benefactor of the treatment. 533 A.2d at 616.
82. 533 A.2d at 616-17; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. The D.C. Court of Appeals, how-
ever, recognized that "the state has compelling interests in protecting the life and health of
both children and viable unborn children." 533 A.2d at 616-17.
83. The court recognized the argument that the state may infringe upon the mother's
right to bodily autonomy to protect the life of the fetus, unless to do so will significantly affect
the health of the mother and unless the child does not have a significant chance of being born
alive. 533 A.2d at 617. The court noted that "the death rate of women upon whom Caesarean
sections have been performed is between 0.1 percent and 1 percent, significantly higher than
the death rate of women who have delivered their babies vaginally." Id. at 617 n.5.
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rean section would not significantly affect A.C.'s condition because she had,
at best, two days left of sedated life.... The child, on the other hand, had a
chance of surviving delivery, despite the possibility that it would be born
handicapped.", 84  Therefore, Carder's right of bodily integrity must be
subordinated to the state interest in protecting innocent third parties.85
III. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found this to be' a
unique case and, consequently, did not rely on any one particular case or
area of law. While Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth.8 6 was
similar, the Georgia court never delineated any real foundation upon which
the court in In re A. C. could build. Because the Jefferson court failed to
discuss in depth the underlying rationale and issues, the decision provided
little guidance to the District of Columbia court.87 Consequently, Judge Ne-
beker in his opinion merely cited Jefferson v. Spalding County Hosp. Auth.
An examination of Roe indicates a pregnant woman has a strong interest
in the integrity of her body. However, as the court in In re A. C. recognized,
Carder's interest was limited by the compelling state interest in preserving
the fetus' life. Two points need to be made about the limitation of a states
compelling interest which the court failed to highlight. First, in two cases
subsequent to Roe, Colautti v. Franklin8 8 and Thornburgh v. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 89, the Supreme Court limited the no-
tion of "compelling state interest." The high court opined that the state
cannot cause an increased risk to the mother's health, welfare, or life.9" The
court in In re A. C. ignored the rule prescribed in these Supreme Court deci-
sions and reinstated the "significant risk" standard, which would limit the
compelling state interest only when it caused a significant risk to the mother.
The high court, however, concluded that the "significant risk" standard was
constitutionally repugnant. 9 1
84. Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981); see supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
87. The Jefferson court cited only three cases in its opinion: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964);
and Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
88. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
89. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
90. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
91. The D.C. Superior court remarked that a Caesarean section could be ordered as long
as the risk to the mother's health, well-being and life is not significant. The court implied that
the risk encountered by the mother in such an operation is not significant enough to overcome
the probability of the fetus' survival. 533 A.2d at 617. While the Supreme Court has not
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However, what constitutes an "increased risk" remains an unanswered
question. While the Court has not explained this, one can obviously realize
that it does not mean any increased risk. If it was any increased risk it
potentially would preclude any state interest in the health and life of the
fetus. The better definition of "increased risk" would consider the compari-
son of the risk involved when the Caesarean section is performed to the risk
involved without the Caesarean section. Generally, it would be a compari-
son between the risk involved without the medical treatment and the risk
involved in pursuing the medical treatment. In so doing, this test incorpo-
rates the risk which exists in the surgery. For example, in Jefferson,92 if the
pregnant woman were to attempt a vaginal delivery, there was a fifty percent
chance that she would not survive the delivery. However, if she has the
Caesarean section, there is a ninety-nine percent chance of survival.93 So if
the mother has the surgery, there is a one percent risk, but if she does not
have it performed, she has a fifty percent risk. Therefore, the surgery actu-
ally decreases the risk to the mother. Since the risk to the mother is lower
when the operation is performed, her bodily integrity right becomes
subordinate to the state's interest in the fetus' health. This comports with
the sanctity given to the mother's right to bodily autonomy, because Jeffer-
son presents a situation where the mother's and fetus' life, health and well-
being are parallel, unlike in In re A. C. where the mother's and fetus' life,
health and well-being conflict.
Second, if treatment is allowed that would jeopardize the life, well-being,
or health of the mother, then Roe, holding that even a viable fetus could be
aborted when it endangers the life, well-being or health of the mother, would
be contradicted.94 Therefore, while Roe recognizes a compelling state inter-
est when the fetus is viable, it still qualifies it when the mother's health and
life are at stake. Roe's underlying policy concludes that the mother's life,
health and well-being are superior to the state's compelling interest in the
fetus when the mother's and fetus' life, health and well-being conflict.
In re A. C. presents a problem for the "increased risk" test. Judge Nebeker
implied that because the remaining days of Carder's life would be spent se-
dated, on balance, the potentiality of the fetus being born alive should over-
ride the fact that her life may be shortened by the surgery.95 In so doing, the
expounded on its "increased risk" test, it seems to imply that an increased risk to the mother
for the sake of the fetus' well-being is not acceptable.
92. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981); see supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
93. 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
94. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
95. He remarked, "This case does not present facts indicating that A.C.'s good health was
being sacrificed to save her child's life .... " 533 A.2d at 615 n.4. However, he stated earlier
in the opinion that the court should not "opine whether the decision would have or should
1989]
336 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 5:319
court appears to be determining the quality of Carder's life. In this whole
analysis, the mother's quality of life should not be considered. In Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp. 96, a Massachusetts court stated: "It is antithetical
to our scheme of ordered liberty and to our respect for the autonomy of the
individual for the State to make decisions regarding the individual's quality
of life."97 It is not the authority of the court to decide on the quality of the
pregnant woman's life. Therefore, the fact that Carder would have been se-
dated the rest of her remaining days, should be of no consequence in this
matter.
98
When balancing the mother's right and the state's interest in the fetus, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia emphasized the probability of
the fetus being born alive as a factor which required placement on the scale.
The D.C. court used a "significant" test again, stating that a state cannot
infringe on the mother's bodily integrity "unless the child has a significant
chance of being alive." 99 The court seems to use the "significant" test to
focus on the fetus' chance for survival rather than the increased harm caused
to the woman from the surgery. This analysis does not comport with the
analysis of Roe. Roe determined that if the fetus is viable the state can pre-
vent the abortion, unless there is an increased risk to the mother. The Roe
analysis focused on the risk to the mother and not the fetus' chances for
survival. "
Indeed, if the courts begin to focus on what is most advantageous for the
life, health and well-being of the fetus, the analysis becomes problematic.
This can become a slippery slope in which the state may conceivably order
all the mother's prenatal care guised as a benefit for the fetus. °0
have been different if her quality of life during that period had been better than it was." Id. at
614.
Dr. Hamner did, however, claim that the surgery actually may not hinder A.C.'s health or
life, but instead, it may have helped her because once the fetus is removed, it would relieve
pressure from A.C.'s body. Remnick, supra note 10, at 21.
96. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
97. Id. at 434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635; see also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 367, 486 A.2d
1209, 1232-33; In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass App. Ct. 466, 473, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); Erickson
v. Dilgard, 44 Misc.2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
98. The decision on medical treatment and the effects on the patient is the patient's alone
to judge. The doctors can only provide the facts to the patient, and the patient must make a
decision based upon those facts. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
99. 533 A.2d at 617. The court must consider "significant" to be at least somewhere over
fifty percent since A.C.'s fetus was given a fifty to sixty percent chance of survival, and the
court still ordered the surgery.
100. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
101. ACLU Asks Court To Rehear Case of Forced Cesarean Birth, Wash. Post, Nov. 25,
1987, at Al, col. 4.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While this area of the law is still developing, it is clear that many scenarios
could exist. Therefore, the analysis which must be used needs to be flexible
enough to cover the myriad of possible factual patterns. The D.C. Court of
Appeals' analysis considered all the areas of law which require accounting,
but applied some rules too strictly. With these areas of law now being used
as the basis in the balancing test, the court has at least recognized the enor-
mous importance of a woman's right of bodily integrity.
A court ordered Caesarean section involves numerous controversial is-
sues. For the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to resolve these
issues, they have developed a delicate balance between the mother's right to
bodily autonomy and the state's compelling interest in the health, welfare
and life of the fetus. However, in its balance, the court failed to give suffi-
cient weight to the increased harm which the woman would be required to
endure when undergoing a Caesarean section.
During this process, the court considered the case law regarding the right
to privacy generally, which is encompassed in the competent adult's right to
refuse medical treatment and the parent's right to refuse treatment on behalf
of his or her offspring. In all these cases a critical underlying problem is the
fetus' legal status which has not been determined in Roe and its progeny.
Consequently, this problem requires an explicit solution.
While it is difficult to determine the type of impact In re A. C. may have on
future decisions, it, in combination with Jefferson, has assisted in the estab-
lishment of further intrusions into the private life and body of the pregnant
woman.
Douglas B. Snyder
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